This dissertation aims to analyze, clarify, and reconstruct the concept of class consciousness by developing a dialectical account of political agency at work in the concept. I defend a dialectical account of agency, that includes both the way in which individuals come together to form groups, but also the capacity of a collective to transform social conditions. I argue that this account of political agency is necessary in order to understand the possibility of social transformation or change. I trace the (...) development of the relationship between consciousness and agency in the early tradition of Western Marxism, focusing primarily on the account of class consciousness given by Georg Lukács in History and Class Consciousness. Against his account of the world historical agency of a unified proletariat, however, I defend Theodor Adorno’s insistence on nonidentity, and the importance of unreconciled groups in capitalist society. In order to understand these groups, such as the vanguard, party, or proletariat, we must understand the way in which individuals form groups, as well as their inherent collectivity. -/- My account of the political agency at work in the concept of class consciousness is broadly speaking pluralist. I argue that a multiplicity of methodologies is needed in order to arrive at a complete picture of the concept. I defend an account of class consciousness that is neither reductive nor deflationary with respect to other dimensions of social domination. This class forward approach seeks to build intersectional political coalitions in order to undertake revolutionary action. Successful revolutionary social transformation is never guaranteed in advance; however, the concept of class consciousness, reconstructed through the lens of political agency, offers conceptual resources to address the problems of today, for the sake of a better tomorrow. (shrink)

Could it be right to convict and punish defendants using only statistical evidence? In this paper, I argue that it is not and explain why it would be wrong. This is difficult to do because there is a powerful argument for thinking that we should convict and punish defendants using statistical evidence. It looks as if the relevant cases are cases of decision under risk and it seems we know what we should do in such cases (i.e., maximize expected value). (...) Given some standard assumptions about the values at stake, the case for convicting and punishing using statistical evidence seems solid. In trying to show where this argument goes wrong, I shall argue (against Lockeans, reliabilists, and others) that beliefs supported only by statistical evidence are epistemically defective and (against Enoch, Fisher, and Spectre) that these epistemic considerations should matter to the law. To solve the puzzle about the role of statistical evidence in the law, we need to revise some commonly held assumptions about epistemic value and defend the relevance of epistemology to this practical question. (shrink)

Functional diversity holds the promise of understanding ecosystems in ways unattainable by taxonomic diversity studies. Underlying this promise is the intuition that investigating the diversity of what organisms actually do—i.e. their functional traits—within ecosystems will generate more reliable insights into the ways these ecosystems behave, compared to considering only species diversity. But this promise also rests on several conceptual and methodological—i.e. epistemic—assumptions that cut across various theories and domains of ecology. These assumptions should be clearly addressed, notably for the sake (...) of an effective comparison and integration across domains, and for assessing whether or not to use functional diversity approaches for developing ecological management strategies. The objective of this contribution is to identify and critically analyze the most salient of these assumptions. To this aim, we provide an “epistemic roadmap” that pinpoints these assumptions along a set of historical, conceptual, empirical, theoretical, and normative dimensions. (shrink)

A familiar complaint about conciliatory approaches to disagreement is that they are self-defeating or incoherent because they ‘call for their own rejection’. This complaint seems to be influential but it isn’t clear whether conciliatory views call for their own rejection or what, if anything, this tells us about the coherence of such views. We shall look at two ways of developing this self-defeat objection and we shall see that conciliatory views emerge unscathed. A simple version of the self-defeat objection leaves (...) conciliatory views untouched. A subtle version of the objection contains a subtle but overlooked flaw. If the conciliatory view is right, it might be right to be dogmatically conciliatory (i.e., to continue to be conciliatory however objectionable this might seem to ourselves and to others). (shrink)

Abstract: When do we meet the standard of proof in a criminal trial? Some have argued that it is when the guilt of the defendant is sufficiently probable on the evidence. Some have argued that it is a matter of normic support. While the first view provides us with a nice account of how we ought to manage risk, the second explains why we shouldn’t convict on the basis of naked statistical evidence alone. Unfortunately, this second view doesn’t help us (...) understand how we should manage risk (e.g., the risk of violating rights against wrongful conviction) and faces counterexamples of its own. I shall defend an alternative approach that builds on the strengths of these two accounts. On the approach defending here, it is objectively suitable to punish iff we know a defendant to be guilty. To determine what is consistent with procedural justice and to determine what we prospectively ought to do, we need to think about the risks we face of deviating from this objective ideal. (shrink)

My contribution to the author meets critics discussion of Pritchard's _Epistemological Disjunctivism_. In this paper, I examine some of the possible motivations for epistemological disjunctivism and look at some of the costs associated with the view. While Pritchard's view seems to be that our visual beliefs constitute knowledge because they're based on reasons, I argue that the claim that visual beliefs are based on reasons or evidence hasn't been sufficiently motivated. In the end I suggest that we'll get all the (...) benefits with none of the costs of epistemological disjunctivism if we accept E=K. (shrink)

While we often assume that we can only know what is so, it's clear that we often speak as if we know things that aren't strictly speaking true. What should we make of this? Some would argue that we should take this talk as evidence that it's possible to know things that are strictly speaking false when, say, false representations are adequate for our purposes. I shall argue that it would be better on the whole to say (a) that knowledge (...) ascriptions might be false but felicitous when the ascription relates a thinker to a falsehood than to say (b) that the ascriptions are strictly true. First, it seems that the arguments for thinking that we can know falsehoods overgeneralise (e.g., they don't just threaten the factivity of knowledge-ascriptions but also of claims about what's true or what's a fact). Thus, the motivation for abandoning the traditional view is problematic. Second, it seems that the alternative picture inherits the problems that contextualists face in understanding how knowledge might be normative for assertion and belief. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall discuss a problem that arises when you try to combine an attractive account of what constitutes evidence with an independently plausible account of the kind of access we have to our evidence. According to E = K, our evidence consists of what we know. According to the principle of armchair access, we can know from the armchair what our evidence is. Combined, these claims entail that we can have armchair knowledge of the external world. Because (...) it seems that the principle of armchair access is supported by widely shared intuitions about epistemic rationality, it seems we ought to embrace an internalist conception of evidence. I shall argue that this response is mistaken. Because externalism about evidence can accommodate the relevant intuitions about epistemic rationality, the principle of armchair access is unmotivated. We also have independent reasons for preferring externalism about evidence to the principle of armchair access. (shrink)

We examine two leading theories of rational belief, the Lockean view and the explanationist view. The first is appealing because it fits with some independently plausible claims about the ways that rational persons pursue their aims. The second is appealing because it seems to account for intuitions that cause trouble for the Lockean view. While fitting the intuitive data is desirable, we are troubled that the explanationist view seems to clash with our theoretical beliefs about what rationality must be like. (...) We think that upon further examination, the intuitive appeal of the explanationist view starts to diminish. We also think that these further intuitions that spell trouble for the explanationist spell trouble for any theory that is not expectationist. We propose a novel expectationist theory of rational belief that improves upon the Lockean and the explanationist views. We think that recent defences of the Lockean view contain an important insight. A substantive theory of rational response should be based on a suitable theory of prizes and a suitable theory of how we should pursue prizes in the face of uncertainty. Most theories of rational belief typically take for granted a truth-centred picture of epistemic prizes (e.g., that epistemic desirability and undesirability can be fully understood in terms of accuracy) and then differ in terms of how they recommend pursuing prizes so understood. We think the Lockeans embrace plausible principles of how prizes should be pursued. We trace the difficulties that this view faces to veritistic assumptions about prizes. We suggest that some prizes are epistemically loaded in that a complete description of the prize will itself make reference to our epistemic states or standards. We argue that knowledge matters to rational belief and choice because in the epistemic domain, knowledge is the prize. We see this in practical domains, too. In some choice settings, what's desired is desired, in part, because it involves a kind of connection to reality only knowledge provides. (shrink)

This is a defence of externalism about knowledge and also about justification. In this paper, I argue that an important virtue of externalism about these notions is that externalism about justification helps to explain the value of (i.e., importance of) knowledge. I also develop and expand upon some of my earlier arguments for externalism that drew upon what's now known as 'morally loaded cases'. The virtue of externalism is that it's the only view that can both allow for certain kinds (...) of categorical normative requirements while also vindicating the idea that we ought to be guided by the beliefs that we ought to have. (Internalists either have to deny that we ought to be guided by the beliefs that we ought to have (which isn't very internalist!) or, failing that, revise our views about the existence of certain kinds of categorical requirements and tell us that we ought to be guided by our beliefs to do evil things (which isn't very nice!).). (shrink)

We argue that there is nothing that can do the work that normative reasons are expected to do. A currently popular view is that in any given situation, a set of normative reasons (understood as a set of facts, typically about the agent’s situation) always determines the ways we prospectively should or should not respond. We discuss an example that we think shows no such collection of facts could have this normative significance. A radical response might be to dispense with (...) reasons and explain the facts about the ways we should respond using something else entirely (e.g., expected value). We think a more fruitful approach is to explore the possibility of using decision-theoretic tools in a reasons-centred framework. (shrink)

I argue that justification isn't just in the head. The argument is simple. We should be guided by our beliefs. We shouldn't be guided by anything to do what we shouldn't do. So, we shouldn't believe in ways that would guide us to do the things that we shouldn't. Among the various things we should do is discharge our duties (e.g., to fulfil our promissory obligations) and respect the rights of others (e.g., rights not to be harmed or killed by (...) agents acting on bad information). The grounds of our duties and obligations aren't just in the head. Thus, the conditions that bear on the justification of our beliefs cannot be contained wholly in our heads. The internalist might be right about aspects of normativity, but their theories tell us important normative truths without telling us the whole truth. In addition to norms that tell us how to process information, there are norms that tell us how we ought to live together. In information-asymmetry cases, these norms clearly come apart. Important normative questions about what we should do when agents (who, we might suppose, do what they subjectively ought to do) have interests that come into conflict can only be answered by externalist theories that recognise information-transcendent norms and normatively significant relations that don't supervene upon the information of any agent in particular. The internalist picture turns out to be disturbing precisely because it falls silent when we're faced with questions about how to resolve these conflicts. Resolving these conflicts should be a pressing concern for every normative theory. (shrink)

Our epistemology can shape the way we think about perception and experience. Speaking as an epistemologist, I should say that I don’t necessarily think that this is a good thing. If we think that we need perceptual evidence to have perceptual knowledge or perceptual justification, we will naturally feel some pressure to think of experience as a source of reasons or evidence. In trying to explain how experience can provide us with evidence, we run the risk of either adopting a (...) conception of evidence according to which our evidence isn’t very much like the objects of our beliefs that figure in reasoning (e.g., by identifying our evidence with experiences or sensations) or the risk of accepting a picture of experience according to which our perceptions and perceptual experiences are quite similar to beliefs in terms of their objects and their representational powers. But I think we have good independent reasons to resist identifying our evidence with things that don’t figure in our reasoning as premises and I think we have good independent reason to doubt that experience is sufficiently belief-like to provide us with something premise-like that can figure in reasoning. We should press pause. We shouldn’t let questionable epistemological assumptions tell us how to do philosophy of mind. I don’t think that we have good reason to think that we need the evidence of the senses to explain how perceptual justification or knowledge is possible. Part of my scepticism derives from the fact that I think we can have kinds of knowledge where the relevant knowledge is not evidentially grounded. Part of my scepticism derives from the fact that there don’t seem to be many direct arguments for thinking that justification and knowledge always requires evidential support. In this paper, I shall consider the three arguments I’ve found for thinking that justification and knowledge do always require evidential support and explain why I don’t find them convincing. I think that we can explain perceptual justification, rationality, and defeat without assuming that our experiences provide us with evidence. In the end, I think we can partially vindicate Davidson’s (notorious) suggestion that our beliefs, not experiences, provide us with reasons for forming further beliefs. This idea turns out to be compatible with foundationalism once we understand that foundational status can come from something other than evidential support. (shrink)

This paper discusses Claytons theory on Comprehensive enrolment of children by their parents. This paper supports Claytons view that we should not enrol children. However, Cameron raises objections which cause problems for the application of this framework. Namely, the cost of giving up a belief, choices made for us in childhood and the application of the PRR (Public Reason Restriction) to the way the parent-child relationship should function. Some modifications to Clayton’s framework and further debate is required to fully (...) address these issues. The conclusion is that we should be able to enrol children in activities that would be of low future cost if rejected but we should not enrol children in activities of high future rejection cost. This enrolment is tempered by the statement “the fundamental motivation of parents should be to conform with public reason i.e. to treat their children in accordance with norms that are capable of acceptance by any free and equal person”. As Clayton states: “I am not ruling out the imposition of a comprehensive doctrine on the child. I am rejecting its imposition in the absence of an argument from public reason”. The structure of this essay is as follows: In Section One I explore Clayton’s theories of end state autonomy and autonomy as a precondition, I then look at the plausible relationship between the state-citizen and child-parent relationships. The Public Reason Restriction is then examined in connection with comprehensive enrolment. In the next section, I look at objections to Clayton’s view from Cameron and any subsequent replies to this from Clayton. I then conclude by discussing the differences between the two views and add my own view to this. (shrink)

After noting the absence of a mutual confrontation, the aim of this research has been redefined in reconstructing the influence of Habermas’ writings on the work of Zygmunt Bauman – an aspect known to scholars of the Polish sociologist but not very well recognized in the international sociological community. Following a philological and critical literary approach, the Baumanian interpretations – selective, discontinuous and, often, erroneous – have been systematized into two main topics: 1) the epistemological foundations of social theory; 2) (...) the normative foundations of critical theory (and the relationship with praxis). Bauman; Habermas; sociology; (post)modernity; praxis Dopo aver constatato l’inesistenza di un reciproco confronto, lo scopo della ricerca si è ridefinito nel ricostruire l’influenza degli scritti di Habermas sull’opera di Zygmunt Bauman – un aspetto noto agli studiosi del sociologo polacco ma poco conosciuto nella comunità socio-logica internazionale. Seguendo un approccio filologico e critico letterario, le interpretazioni baumaniane – selettive, discontinue e, spesso, erronee – sono state sistematizzate in due principali temi: 1) i fonda-menti conoscitivi della teoria sociale; 2) i fondamenti normativi della teoria critica (e il rapporto con la prassi). -/- Parole chiave: Bauman; Habermas; sociologia; (post)modernità; prassi -/- In "Zygmunt Bauman. I cancelli dell’acqua", a cura di Riccardo Mazzeo. Maria Caterina Federici, Editoriale. Bauman e dell’incertezza Riccardo Mazzeo, Premessa. I cancelli dell’acqua Riccardo Mazzeo, Introduzione. Il pendolo di Zygmunt Bauman - Mauro Magatti, Siamo ancora nella modernità liquida? Un esercizio di sociologia baumaniana - Benedetto Vecchi, La missione impossibile di Zygmunt Bauman - Vanni Codeluppi, Bauman: il consumo come compito - Raffaele Federici, Forme e impressionismo nel disagio della postmodernità - Vincenzo Romania, Zygmunt Bauman e la modernità dell’Olocausto: fra crucialità delle domande e debolezza delle risposte - Daniele Francesconi, Zygmunt Bauman. L’intellettuale sulla scena - Claudio Tugnoli, La morte di "terzo grado" come stile di vita. Esorcismi della paura nell’opera di Zygmunt Bauman - Sabina Curti, Paura liquida e ruolo degli intellettuali in Zygmunt Bauman - Luca Corchia, Bauman e Habermas su teoria e prassi. Alle origini di un confronto incompiuto - Marta Carlini, Jakub Pichalski, Bibliografia ragionata degli scritti italiani di e su Zygmunt Bauman - Federico Batini, Giulia Toti, Una scuola per tutti? Riflessioni a margine di "Conversazioni sull’educazione" Recensioni. (shrink)

REPRODUÇÃO ANIMAL: TRANSFERÊNCIA DE EMBRIÕES EM ANIMAIS, E A INDÚSTRIA DE EMBRIÕES NO BRASIL -/- ANIMAL BREEDING: EMBRYO TRANSFER IN ANIMALS, AND THE EMBRYO INDUSTRY IN BRAZIL Apoio: Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Departamento de Zootecnia da UFRPE E-mail: [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 -/- 1. INTRODUÇÃO A técnica da inseminação artificial tornou possível aumentar o impacto na descendência de touros geneticamente superiores em termos de produção láctea das filhas. Com a transferência de embriões é possível aumentar o impacto da fêmea sobre (...) a população das filhas. A transferência de embriões data de 1890, ano em que Heape obteve o nascimento de coelhos transferindo ovócitos fecundados de uma fêmea para outra. A partir de 1930, é repetida uma série de experiências para desenvolver a técnica e aplicá-la em ovinos, caprinos (1934) e bovinos (1951) como espécies mais idôneas para a reprodução. A Inglaterra e os Estados Unidos estabeleceram as bases para o comércio de embriões durante os anos sessenta e setenta. De forma resumida, a transferência de embriões implica na estimulação da produção de ovócitos mediante a aplicação de hormônios: cerca de 6-8 dias após a cobrição dessas fêmeas ou da sua inseminação artificial, os óvulos fertilizados são extraídos dos órgãos genitais da fêmea doadora por perfusão ou lavagem com soluções biológicas controladas e testadas, originando-se uma deposição dos gametas fecundados nas fêmeas receptoras que serão encarregadas de levar adiante a gestação e o parto sem influência sobre as produções do novo indivíduo. 2. MANEJO DAS FÊMEAS DOADORAS É relativamente fácil obter um embrião, uma vez que pode origina-se a partir do cio natural das vacas cíclicas. No entanto, a fim de otimizar a técnica, o normal é «superovular» a fêmea doadora e obter um número superior de gametas fecundadas após cada lavagem ou perfusão das genitais. A maioria das fêmeas doadoras são tratadas com gonadotrofinas (PMSG) ou com hormônios estimuladores da foliculogênese (FSH). Estes hormônios invertem a atresia normal de folículos permitindo uma maturação, que em condições normais não se realizaria. O mecanismo exato do funcionamento destas hormonas não é totalmente claro. A superovulação multiplica por um fator de 10 o número de ovócitos recuperados no caso das vacas, ovelhas e cabras, mas apenas por um fator 2 ou 3 no caso das porcas. Existe um acordo geral sobre a utilização das gonadotrofinas; a PMSG deve ser aplicada durante a transição da fase luteica para a folicular, ou seja, no 16º dia do ciclo. As doses de gonadotrofinas variam entre 1500 e 3000 UI em bovinos, aumentando a resposta e a variabilidade individual com o aumento da dose. A resposta ao tratamento varia de acordo em função de diversos fatores. Neste contexto, merecem especial atenção a espécie, a raça, a época e a conformação corporal do animal, bem como o lote de fabricação da preparação hormonal (quadro 7.1). Estudos demonstram que, nos bovinos, as raças de corte respondem melhor ao tratamento do que as raças leiteiras. Tabela 1: Doses de gonadotrofinas em UI -/- Espécie Dia do ciclo Crescimento folicular_ ___ PMSG FSH Ovulação _____ PMSG FSH Bovinos 8 – 10 1500 – 3000 20 – 50 1500 – 2000 75 – 200 Caprinos 16 – 17 1000 – 1500 12 – 20 1000 – 1500 50 – 75 Ovinos 12 – 14 1000 – 2000 12 – 20 1000 – 1500 50 – 75 Suínos 15 – 17 750 – 1500 10 – 20 500 – 1000 25 – 50 Coelhos — 25 – 75 2 – 3 25 – 75 2 – 3 Fonte: HAFEZ, 2004. O FSH também é utilizado para superovulação em várias espécies. Nos ovinos, injetam-se 2 mg desta hormona 12 horas antes da retirada das esponjas, aplicando-se mais três injeções, com um intervalo de 12 horas, até 24 horas após a retirada das esponjas, o que corresponde a um total de 8 mg de FSH injetados por tratamento e animal. Às vezes, e dependendo do país, existem dificuldades para a obtenção desse hormônio em condições de pureza adequada para que o tratamento proporcione o resultado esperado. Nas vacas dadoras devem ter passado mais de 50 dias após o último parto: também ser animais cíclicos, encontrar-se num nível nutricional elevado e em aumento, sem deficiências especificas alimentares. Existe uma indicação de suplementação das fêmeas doadoras com minerais essenciais antes do tratamento. 3. OBTENÇÃO DE EMBRIÕES Uma vez as fêmeas doadoras inseminadas, entre o sexto e o oitavo dia, procede-se a coleta dos embriões. Para isso, atualmente se utilizam cateteres de obtenção transcervical (tipo Foley, Rusch. etc.) munidos de uma bola insuflável na sua extremidade que permite criar um compartimento estanque na parte distal do córneo uterino e proceder ao arrasto dos embriões ali localizados. Para obter esta «lavagem» utiliza-se uma solução aquosa tamponada: o meio mais frequentemente utilizado é o tampão fosfato salino (PBS: pH = 7; PO = 280 - 290 mOsm/kg) suplementado com antibióticos e proteínas. Depois de recuperado o meio de lavagem, os embriões devem ser isolados do volume total, avaliados segundo critérios do Manual da Sociedade Internacional de Transferência de Embriões de acordo com seu estado de desenvolvimento. Código numérico para determinar o grau de desenvolvimento embrionário: N° 1: ovócito não fertilizado ou embrião de uma célula (1 dia). N° 2: Identifica embriões com 2 a 16 células (2-4 dias). N° 3: Identifica mórulas adiantadas (5-6 dias). N° 4: Identifica mórulas compactas de 6 dias de idade. N° 5: blastocisto adiantado (7 dias). N° 6: blastocisto (7-8 dias). N° 7: blastocisto expandido (8-9 dias). N° 8: blastocisto eclodido (9 dias) a partir do nono ou décimo dia o blastocisto já está fora da zona pelúcida. Além da classificação por estado de desenvolvimento, a referida Sociedade Internacional estabeleceu uma categorização dos embriões com base na qualidade dos mesmos. Assim os denomina: 1: excelente; 2: bom; 3: regular; 4: degenerado. Segundo as investigações de diversos autores especialistas no tema não devem ser transferidos embriões que não tenham sido classificados como excelentes ou bons. A obtenção dos embriões pode ser realizada em uma clínica, em unidades móveis especializadas, ou na própria fazenda. Em todo o caso, a doadora não deve apresentar quaisquer sintomas clínicos de doença, sendo esta responsabilidade direta do veterinário. O rebanho de onde provém a doadora deve estar livre de medidas cautelares sanitárias. Os técnicos devem estar adequadamente limpos e preparados para esta atuação, em um lugar tranquilo e que permita a colocação de equipamentos e material em condições limpas e seguras. 4. TÉCNICAS DE TRANSFERÊNCIA DE EMBRIÕES Recomenda-se que os embriões sejam transferidos o mais rápido possível depois da recuperação. A fêmea receptora deve apresentar um ambiente uterino o mais semelhante possível ao da fêmea doadora. Isto quer dizer que a receptora também será mantida num sistema de sincronização para que coincida o mais possível o estágio de desenvolvimento embrionário com seu correspondente estado uterino. A margem de assincronia para evitar efeitos indesejáveis é de ± 24 horas. Os métodos hormonais de sincronização são análogos aos das doadoras. As técnicas para a deposição dos embriões no seu novo habitat podem ser igualmente cirúrgicas e não cirúrgicas, mas devido aos problemas do uso de anestésicos em técnicas cirúrgicas, as transferências foram direcionadas para modelos não-cirúrgicos ou transcervicais. Este método é baseado na utilização do colo uterino de forma análoga como é realizada na inseminação artificial. Devido às relações entre o embrião e o ovário, as porcentagens de fertilidade são aumentadas ao serem depositadas no corno ipsilateral no ovário que se encontra ativo. A utilização desta técnica implica na obtenção de mais fêmeas gestantes. O uso de novilhas como fêmeas receptoras aumenta também a taxa de gestações a partir de uma maior facilidade de manejo, uniformidade na resposta hormonal e um custo mais baixo. O fator humano ou habilidade do técnico que realiza esta técnica também constitui um fator que influencia decisivamente no êxito da transferência, encontrando-se variações de 20 a 60% devidas a este fator. 5. CONTROLES SANITÁRIOS Com a utilização da inseminação artificial, verificou-se que, embora as tecnologias reprodutivas colaborativas fossem mais avançadas em termos de técnicas destinadas a aumentar a produtividade individual, da mesma forma, podem constituir um perigo de contaminação e de dispersão de doenças estrangeiras para o grupo ou rebanho para onde são transferidos os novos genes. Neste contexto, a transferência embrionária (TE) deve realizar-se tendo em conta os riscos que pode implicar uma manipulação inadequada. Uma vez mais, a Sociedade Internacional (IETS) na Reunião Regional da OIE (Oficina Internacional de Epizootias) estabeleceu as normas em 1985 para que a TE pudesse ser utilizada como meio para controle de doenças na pecuária. Para que a utilização da TE se realize sem risco para a saúde, é necessário ter em conta um certo número de regras e condições específicas que evitem os riscos de contaminação. O embrião está separado do meio externo por três barreiras de proteção: o corpo da mãe, o útero por si só e a terceira, e mais importante, pela zona pelúcida, a qual nos animais domésticos tem demonstrado ser totalmente impermeável a qualquer elemento patogênico, desde que fique intacta. Portanto, o risco de contaminação dos embriões pode vir por duas vias diferentes: a) Fatores extrínsecos - por invasão dos agentes patogênicos na cavidade uterina principalmente. Isto está relacionado com o estado sanitário médio do país, região ou rebanho de origem. b) Fatores intrínsecos - Segundo Thibier podemos considerar diferentes fontes potenciais de contaminação, que segundo o risco sanitário se classificam nas seguintes ordens: 1° Zigoto. 2° Penetração. 3° Absorção. 4° Armazenamento. 5° Exame. 6° Transferência. Os esforços para que os embriões se tornem livres de contaminação devem ser semelhantes aos que são efetuados com os animais vivos e com as doses seminais. O momento mais perigoso encontra-se entre a coleta das células fecundadas e a sua deposição, após seu exame, no trato reprodutivo da receptora. As condições em que o referido processo deve ser realizado encontram-se detalhadas no manual da Sociedade Internacional de Transferência de Embriões (IETS). 6. REGRAS DA IETS A transferência de embriões é a via mais segura para a troca de genes. No entanto, os técnicos devem esforçar-se por manter todas as regras e normas sanitárias para que a coleta e a manipulação dos embriões se realizem sob condições de absoluta garantia higiênica e sanitária. A transferência embrionária implica, pela primeira vez na história da medicina veterinária, que a vigilância sanitária não se aplica estritamente ao animal, uma vez que, na sua fase "in vitro", está inteiramente sob o controle do técnico. Por conseguinte, não haverá futuro para este tipo de biotecnologia se, paralelamente, não houver um elevado nível de garantia de que não «servirá» para não disseminar ou difundir doenças. As conclusões da Sociedade Internacional de Transferência de Embriões (IETS) na sua reunião anual de 14 de Janeiro de 1992 estabelecem, tendo em conta a revisão efetuada em 1991 pela Subdireção de Investigação e pelo Comitê de Importação e Exportação, uma classificação das doenças. Esta classificação corresponde às seguintes categorias: Categoria 1 - Doenças ou agentes de doenças para as quais foram recolhidas provas suficientes para afirmar que o risco de transmissão é negligenciável, desde que os embriões sejam corretamente manipulados entre a coleta e a transferência: a) Leucose bovina enzoótica. b) Febre aftosa (bovinos). c) Língua azul (bovinos). d) Brucelose bovina. e) Rintraqueíte infecciosa bovina. f) Doença de Aujeszky. Categoria 2 - Doenças para as quais foram recolhidas provas substanciais que indicam que o risco de transmissão é insignificante, desde que os embriões sejam corretamente manipulados entre a coleta e a transferência, mas para as quais é necessário verificar os dados existentes através de novas transferências: a) Peste suína clássica. Categoria 3 - Doenças ou agentes de doenças para as quais os resultados preliminares indicam que o risco de transmissão é insignificante, desde que os embriões sejam corretamente manipulados, entre a coleta e a transferência, mas para os quais essas verificações preliminares devem ser corroboradas por dados experimentais complementares "in vitro" e "in vivo": a) Peste bovina. b) Diarreia viral bovina. c) Língua azul (ovinos). d) Febre aftosa (suínos, ovelhas e cabras). e) Campylobacter fetus (ovinos). f) Doença vesicular do porco. g) Peste suína africana. h) Prurido lombar (ovinos). i) Haemophilus somnus. Categoria 4 - Doenças ou agentes de doenças que foram ou são objeto de trabalhos preliminares: a) Vírus Akabane (bovino). b) Estomatite vesicular (bovinos e suínos). c) Chlamydia psittaci (bovinos e suínos). d) Ureaplasma/micoplasmose (bovinos e caprinos). e) Maedi-visna (ovino). f) Adenomatosa pulmonar (ovino). g) Prurido lombar (caprinos). h) Língua azul (caprinos). i) Artrite e encefalite caprina. j) Parvovírus (suíno). k) Enterovírus (bovinos e suínos). I) Leptospirose (suíno). m) Herpesvírus 4 dos bovinos. n) Mycobacterium paratuberculose (bovinos). o) brucelose ovina. p) Doença de Border (ovinos). q) Vírus parainfluenza 3 (bovinos). r) Agente da encefalopatia espongiforme bovina. É interessante salientar que apenas seis doenças estão incluídas na categoria 1 (a mais segura). Isso não significa que as outras doenças tenham um risco maior, apenas indica que o risco de transmissão das doenças da categoria 1 é irrelevante, estatisticamente falando. É importante assinalar que as doenças mais importantes dos bovinos se situam na categoria 1. Isto significa que a incidência do embrião patogênico nos bovinos parece ser perfeitamente controlável, desde que sejam adotadas metodologias adequadas. Isto serve também como linha de defesa adicional para que o técnico centre sua atenção e cuidados entre a fase de obtenção e a de transferência. 7. SITUAÇÃO ATUAL DA TRANSFERÊNCIA DE EMBRIÕES ANIMAIS NO BRASIL O Brasil é um dos grandes responsáveis mundiais pela implantação da tecnologia na reprodução animal, sendo assim, o país conseguiu inserir-se no mercado internacional como um dos maiores produtores de embriões in vivo e in vitro. Nas últimas duas décadas, especialmente entre os anos de 1997 e 2017 o país passou por importantes transformações nesse segmento, dentre essas transformações vale destacar a posição relativa do Brasil no contexto mundial. O Brasil passou de referência regional, nos anos 1990, para se tornar o maior produtor mundial de embriões entre os anos 2012 e 2013, sendo líder no uso e na produção de embriões in vitro. Os primeiros registros da TE produzidos in vivo no Brasil datam da década de 1980, e uma década depois o país já tornara-se referência e detinha um mercado consolidado de produção e TE na espécie bovina. Não obstante, no ano de 1997 o país ainda era referência apenas no contexto regional, detendo 68,3% dos embriões transferidos na América Latina, esse percentual corresponde a 24.085 embriões de um total de 35.254 produzidos na América Latina. Esse percentual regional representa apenas 6,6% de toda a produção mundial de embriões in vivo, que produziu, em 1997, 360.656 embriões in vivo. Nos últimos anos, o mercado de embriões, principalmente o bovino, teve retração moderada de -2,5% ao ano entre 2003 e 2018, porém essa retração contrasta com o ligeiro crescimento observado a partir dos anos 2000 conforme figura 1: Figura 1: Produção de embriões bovinos no Brasil no período 1996-2018, total e por tecnologia adotada (in vivo[IVD] ou in vitro [IVP]). Em 2018, o mercado de embriões bovinos manteve-se inalterado se compararmos com os três anos anteriores, houve reduções nós segmentos de corte, leite e no total comparado ao ano de 2017. Em 2014, a produção de embriões para melhoramento do gado leiteiro teve seu ápice, porém de lá para cá esse mercado manteve-se estagnado como demonstra a tabela 2. Tabela 2: Produção de embriões bovinos no Brasil em 2018, estratificada por segmento e por tecnologia adotada (in vivo ou in vitro). 7.1 Crise, economia e mercado de embriões A indústria de embriões reflete, em maior ou menor grau, o momento da economia brasileira. Apesar do segmento agropecuário ser um setor em constante crescimento no país, ao qual, sem dúvidas, em meio a inúmeras crises mantém-se em constante crescimento. Porém vale ressaltar que esse mercado é emergente e está refletido em paralelo com os bens produzidos pelo país, como demonstra a figura 2. Figura 2: Produção de embriões bovinos e variação no produto interno bruto (PIB) no Brasil, no período 1996-2018. Cada vez mais o setor agropecuário do Brasil investe em novas tecnologias que maximizem o mercado e que melhore a produção dos animais seja no segmento corte ou leite. Segundo a OCDE, 1997, essa indústria da produção de embriões é um conjunto de novas técnicas e processos, frutos do desenvolvimento técnico-científico, que chega ao mercado e - o mais importante - o transforma. Logo, todas essas técnicas e biotecnologias visam, além da alta produção e do lucro, o melhoramento e a suplementação alimentícia da população mundial que está em crescente avanço. A evolução da tecnologia embrionária no país, seja para o melhoramento dos equinos para os esportes como as vaquejadas, hipismo, corridas, etc., onde são investidos tempo, dedicação e dinheiro para formar um novo animal que apresente força, conformação, conversão alimentar e que custa milhões, em muitos casos, não só dos equinos, mas também dos caprinos, ovinos, suínos e até mesmo os bovinos onde o mercado da TE é mais presente e aquecida, venceu os estigmas do “modismo” e o chamado “elitismo”, porém deve enfrentar novos desafios, em especial num contexto de forte concentração do mercado de genética e de concorrência globalizada. Mesmo com todos esses avanços e retrocessos, essa relativização dos números demonstra que um percentual bastante reduzido das fêmeas bovinas que estão em idade reprodutiva é utilizado para a técnica da transferência de embriões, e que o mercado brasileiro ainda tem um grande potencial de crescimento no setor de produção in vivo e in vitro. 8. RESUMO E PRIMEIRAS CONCLUSÕES Ao longo deste trabalho pretendi realizar uma revisão sumária sobre um tema de grande importância presente, e sobretudo futura; referir-me à transferência embrionária. Atualmente, esta técnica atingiu um grau notável de penetração, a nível prático, no gado leiteiro. No entanto, num futuro mais ou menos longínquo, não temos dúvidas quanto a esta técnica, pelas vantagens indubitáveis que apresenta a nível de avanço genético, que será aplicada em outras espécies úteis ao homem. Na minha exposição, tentei dar especial ênfase a dois aspectos: as técnicas de transferência, incluindo as normas IETS e os controles sanitários a serem efetuados. Por fim, a indústria brasileira de embriões mostrou-se em retrocessos e avanços, porém o mercado ainda têm grandes desafios a serem enfrentados ao longo dos anos, mas que serão sanados mediante as técnicas desenvolvidas pelos inúmeros centros de pesquisa embrionárias e seus especialistas. -/- Realização -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – Departamento de Zootecnia da UFRPE. Recife, 2020. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- BALL, Peter JH; PETERS, Andy R. Reproduction in cattle. Nova Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2008. BARUSELLI, Pietro Sampaio et al. Sêmen sexado: inseminação artificial e transferência de embriões. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, v. 31, n. 3, p. 374-381, 2007. BRACKELL, B. G.; JR SEIDEL, G. E.; SEIDEL, S. Avances en zootecnia nuevas técnicas de reproducción animal. Zaragoza: Acribia, 1988. COLE, H. H.; CUPPS, P. T. Reproduction in domestic animals. 1ª ed. Londres: Academic Press, 1977. CURTIS, John L. et al. Cattle embryo transfer procedure. An instruction manual for the rancher, dairyman, artificial insemination technician, animal scientist, and veterinarian. Londres: Academic Press, Inc., 1991. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia da Reprodução Animal: Ovulação, Controle e Sincronização do Cio. Disponível em:. Acesso em: Março de 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia da Reprodução Animal: Fecundação e Gestação. Disponível em:. Acesso em: Março de 2020. DE LA FUENTE, J. Manipulación de embriones en ganado vacuno. Bovis, n. 58, p. 51-61, 1994. GIBBONS, A.; CUETO, M. Manual de transferencia de embriones ovinos y caprinos. Bariloche: Inta, 2013. GONÇALVES, Paulo Bayard Dias; DE FIGUEIREDO, José Ricardo; DE FIGUEIRÊDO FREITAS, Vicente José. Biotécnicas aplicadas à reprodução animal. São Paulo: Editora Roca, 2008. GONÇALVES, Rômany Louise Ribeiro; VIANA, João Henrique Moreira. Situação atual da produção de embriões bovinos no Brasil e no mundo. In: Embrapa Recursos Genéticos e Biotecnologia-Artigo em anais de congresso (ALICE). Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, v. 43, n. 2, p. 156-159, abr./jun. 2019., 2019. HAFEZ, E. S. E.; HAFEZ, B. Reprodução animal. São Paulo: Manole, 2004. HOPPER, Richard M. (Ed.). Bovine reproduction. Nova Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2014. PÉREZ PÉREZ, F.; PÉREZ GUTIÉRREZ, F. Reproducción animal, inseminación animal y transplante de embriones. Barcelona: Cientifico-medica, 1985. MANSOUR, R. T.; ABOULGHAR, M. A. Optimizing the embryo transfer technique. Human reproduction, v. 17, n. 5, p. 1149-1153, 2002. MARTINS, Carlos Frederico. O impacto da transferência de embriões e da fecundação in vitro na produção de bovinos no Brasil. Embrapa Cerrados-Artigo de divulgação na mídia (INFOTECA-E), 2010. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS MCKINNON, A. O.; SQUIRES, E. L. Equine embryo transfer. Veterinary Clinics of North America: Equine Practice, v. 4, n. 2, p. 305-333, 1988. PALMA, G. A.; BREM, G. Transferencia de los embriones. GA Palma & G. Brem. Transferencia de embriones y biotecnología de la reproducción en la especie bovina. Ed. Hemisferio Sur. Buenos Aires, Argentina, p. 143-161, 1993. SCHOOLCRAFT, William B.; SURREY, Eric S.; GARDNER, David K. Embryo transfer: techniques and variables affecting success. Fertility and sterility, v. 76, n. 5, p. 863-870, 2001. SEIDEL, George E. Superovulation and embryo transfer in cattle. Science, v. 211, n. 4480, p. 351-358, 1981. STRINGFELLOW, D. A.; SEIDEL, S. M. Manual of IETS. Savoy IL: IETS, p. 103-130, 1998. STRINGFELLOW, D. A. Manual da sociedade internacional de transferência de embriões. Brasília: Sociedade Brasileira de Transferência de Embriões (SBTE), 1999. THIBIER, M.; NIBART, M. Disease control and embryo importations. Theriogenology, v. 27, n. 1, p. 37-47, 1987. VIANA, J. H. M. Produção e transferência de embriões bovinos em 2018. In: Jornal o embrião. Edição 64, ano 33. Brasília: SBTE, 2019. -/- . (shrink)

It is known that the Big Bang theory was based on the concept of creation ex nihilo, after ancient Greek philosophers. In this paper, we will make few remark on the concept of creatio ex nihilo (as a commentary to a recent paper by Kalachanis, Athanasios Anastasiou, Ioannis Kostikas, Efstratios Theodossious and Мilan S. Dimitrijevi), as well as two other approaches, i.e. Intelligent Design and Emergence Theory by Clayton/Yong. As continuation of our recent paper to appear in forthcoming issue (...) of J. Asia Mathematika, we argue that beside the above three approaches, a new concept called creatio ex-rotatione offers a resolution to the long standing disputes between beginning and eternity of the Universe. In other words, in this respect we agree with Vaas, i.e. it can be shown: “how a conceptual and perhaps physical solution of the temporal aspect of Immanuel Kant’s „first antinomy of pure reason“ is possible, i.e. how our universe in some respect could have both a beginning and an eternal existence. Therefore, paradoxically, there might have been a time before time or a beginning of time in time.” By the help of computational simulation, we also show how a model of early Universe with rotation can fit this new picture. (shrink)

The central thesis of robust virtue epistemology (RVE) is that the difference between knowledge and mere true belief is that knowledge involves success that is attributable to a subject's abilities. An influential objection to this approach is that RVE delivers the wrong verdicts in cases of environmental luck. Critics of RVE argue that the view needs to be supplemented with modal anti-luck condition. This particular criticism rests on a number of mistakes about the nature of ability that I shall try (...) to rectify here. (shrink)

This paper takes a critical look at the idea that knowledge involves reflective access to reasons that provide rational support. After distinguishing between different kinds of awareness, I argue that the kind of awareness involved in awareness of reasons is awareness of something general rather than awareness of something that instances some generality. Such awareness involves the exercise of conceptual capacities and just is knowledge. Since such awareness is knowledge, this kind of awareness cannot play any interesting role in a (...) story about how knowledge is acquired. After arguing that reflective access to reasons is not a precondition on acquiring knowledge, I look at one motivation for introducing this kind of access requirement. I argue that the argument for the access requirement rests on a mistaken assumption about the relationship between reasons and responsibility. While the target of this critical discussion is a version of epistemological disjunctivism, the criticism applies mutatis mutandis to many traditional internalist views in epistemology. (shrink)

Abstract: On one formulation, epistemological disjunctivism is the view that our perceptual beliefs constitute knowledge when they are based on reasons that provide them with factive support. Some would argue that it is impossible to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible unless we assume that we have such reasons to support our perceptual beliefs. Some would argue that it is impossible to understand how perceptual experience could furnish us with these reasons unless we assume that the traditional view of experience (...) is mistaken. For reasons explained here, I think that the epistemological argument for metaphysical disjunctivism rests on mistaken assumptions about reasons and their rational role. Neither disjunctivist view is needed to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible. (shrink)

Strong claims have been made for emergence as a new paradigm for understanding science, consciousness, and religion. Tracing the past history and current definitions of the concept, Clayton assesses the case for emergent phenomena in the natural world and their significance for philosophy and theology. Complex emergent phenomena require irreducible levels of explanation in physics, chemistry and biology. This pattern of emergence suggests a new approach to the problem of consciousness, which is neither reducible to brain states nor proof (...) of a mental substance or soul. Although emergence does not entail classical theism, it is compatible with a variety of religious positions. Clayton concludes with a defence of emergentist panentheism and a Christian constructive theology consistent with the new sciences of emergence. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a puzzle about epistemic rationality. It seems plausible that it should be rational to believe a proposition if you have sufficient evidential support for it. It seems plausible that it rationality requires you to conform to the categorical requirements of rationality. It also seems plausible that our first-order attitudes ought to mesh with our higher-order attitudes. It seems unfortunate that we cannot accept all three claims about rationality. I will present three ways of trying to (...) resolve this tension and argue that the best way to do this is to reject the idea that strong evidential support is the stuff rationality is made of. In the course of doing this, I shall argue that there is a special class of propositions about the requirements of rationality that we cannot make rational mistakes about and explain how this can be. (shrink)

There is much to like about the idea that justification should be understood in terms of normality or normic support (Smith 2016, Goodman and Salow 2018). The view does a nice job explaining why we should think that lottery beliefs differ in justificatory status from mundane perceptual or testimonial beliefs. And it seems to do that in a way that is friendly to a broadly internalist approach to justification. In spite of its attractions, we think that the normic support view (...) faces two serious challenges. The first is that it delivers the wrong result in preface cases. These cases suggest that the view is either too sceptical or too externalist. The second is that the view struggles with certain kinds of Moorean absurdities. It turns out that these problems can easily be avoided. If we think of normality as a condition on *knowledge*, we can characterise justification in terms of its connection to knowledge and thereby avoid the difficulties discussed here. The resulting view does an equally good job explaining why we should think that our perceptual and testimonial beliefs are justified when lottery beliefs cannot be. Thus, it seems that little could be lost and much could be gained by revising the proposal and adopting a view on which it is knowledge, not justification, that depends directly upon normality. (shrink)

Belief does aim at the truth. When our beliefs do not fit the facts, they cannot do what they are supposed to do, because they cannot provide us with reasons. We cannot plausibly deny that a truth norm is among the norms that govern belief. What we should not say is that the truth norm is the fundamental epistemic norm. In this paper, I shall argue that knowledge is the norm of belief and that the truth norm has a derivative (...) status. Only a knowledge‐first approach to epistemic normativity can explain why epistemic assessment has its inward‐looking focus. (shrink)

The typical epistemology course begins with a discussion of the distinction between justification and knowledge and ends without any discussion of the distinction between justification and excuse. This is unfortunate. If we had a better understanding of the justification-excuse distinction, we would have a better understanding of the intuitions that shape the internalism-externalism debate. My aims in this paper are these. First, I will explain how the kinds of excuses that should interest epistemologists exculpate. Second, I will explain why the (...) intuitions that underwrite the new evil demon argument don't provide support for the internalist claim that justification is just in the head. The positive response that Cohen's example elicits is an indication that the subject should be excused if she violates an epistemic norm, not an indication that no norm has been violated. For just about any conceivable norm we can think of we can imagine situations in which someone violates that norm because they're moved by evidence that misleadingly suggests that they'd conform to it. When that happens, we'll respond positively in just the way we do when we consider Cohen's deceived subjects. When that happens, we cannot say that the subjects' responses were justified because we've stipulated that the subjects' responses contravene the relevant norms. Regardless of whether you think of norms along internalist or externalist lines, you should see that the intuitions that underwrite the new evil demon objection tell us nothing at all about whether a subject conforms to a norm. They tell us nothing about justification. (shrink)

This is a reply to Jon Matheson on conciliationism and the self-defeat objection. I argue that the problems that Matheson discusses derive from his evidentialist assumptions, not from conciliationism.

Abstract: On the standard story about knowledge, knowledge has a normative dimension by virtue of the fact that knowledge involves justification. On the standard story, justification is necessary but insufficient for knowledge. The additional conditions that distinguish knowledge from justified belief are normatively insignificant. In this chapter we will consider whether the concept of knowledge might be irrelevant to normative questions in epistemology. Some proponents of the standard story might think that it is, but we shall see that the concept (...) of knowledge might play three important roles in answering normative questions in epistemology. The concept might be useful in helping us understand evidence and epistemic reasons, the kind of rational support required for justification, and in formulating epistemic norms. (shrink)

A defense of the idea that knowledge is first in the sense that there is nothing prior to knowledge that puts reasons or evidence in your possession. Includes a critical discussion of the idea that perception or perceptual experience might provide reasons and a defense of a knowledge-first approach to justified belief.

This paper looks at whether it is possible to unify the requirements of rationality with the demands of normative reasons. It might seem impossible to do because one depends upon the agent’s perspective and the other upon features of the situation. Enter Reasons Perspectivism. Reasons perspectivists think they can show that rationality does consist in responding correctly to reasons by placing epistemic constraints on these reasons. They think that if normative reasons are subject to the right epistemic constraints, rational requirements (...) will correspond to the demands generated by normative reasons. While this proposal is prima facie plausible, it cannot ultimately unify reasons and rationality. There is no epistemic constraint that can do what reasons perspectivists would need it to do. Some constraints are too strict. The rest are too slack. This points to a general problem with the reasons-first program. Once we recognize that the agent’s epistemic position helps determine what she should do, we have to reject the idea that the features of the agent’s situation can help determine what we should do. Either rationality crowds out reasons and their demands or the reasons will make unreasonable demands. (shrink)

This is a critical discussion of the accuracy-first approach to epistemic norms. If you think of accuracy (gradational or categorical) as the fundamental epistemic good and think of epistemic goods as things that call for promotion, you might think that we should use broadly consequentialist reasoning to determine which norms govern partial and full belief. After presenting consequentialist arguments for probabilism and the normative Lockean view, I shall argue that the consequentialist framework isn't nearly as promising as it might first (...) appear. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a new theory of rationality defeat. We propose that defeaters are "indicators of ignorance", evidence that we’re not in a position to know some target proposition. When the evidence that we’re not in a position to know is sufficiently strong and the probability that we can know is too low, it is not rational to believe. We think that this account retains all the virtues of the more familiar approaches that characterise defeat in terms of (...) its connection to reasons to believe or to confirmation but provides a better approach to higher-order defeat. We also think that a strength of this proposal is that it can be embedded into a larger normative framework. On our account the no-defeater condition is redundant. We can extract our theory of defeat from our theory of what makes it rational to believe—it is rational to believe when it is sufficiently probable that our belief would be knowledge. Thus, our view can provide a monistic account of defeat, one that gives a unifying explanation of the toxicity of different defeaters that is grounded in a framework that either recognises knowledge as the norm of belief or identifies knowledge as the fundamental epistemic good that full belief can realise. (shrink)

Cases of reasonable, mistaken belief figure prominently in discussions of the knowledge norm of assertion and practical reason as putative counterexamples to these norms. These cases are supposed to show that the knowledge norm is too demanding and that some weaker norm ought to put in its place. These cases don't show what they're intended to. When you assert something false or treat some falsehood as if it's a reason for action, you might deserve an excuse. You often don't deserve (...) even that. (shrink)

There has been considerable discussion recently of consequentialist justifications of epistemic norms. In this paper, I shall argue that these justifications are not justifications. The consequentialist needs a value theory, a theory of the epistemic good. The standard theory treats accuracy as the fundamental epistemic good and assumes that it is a good that calls for promotion. Both claims are mistaken. The fundamental epistemic good involves accuracy, but it involves more than just that. The fundamental epistemic good is knowledge, not (...) mere true belief, because the goodness of an epistemic state is connected to that state's ability to give us reasons. If I'm right about the value theory, this has a number of significant implications for the consequentialist project. First, the good-making features that attach to valuable full beliefs are not features of partial belief. The resulting value theory does not give us the values we need to give consequentialist justifications of credal norms. Second, the relevant kind of good does not call for promotion. It is good to know, but the rational standing of a belief is not determined by the belief's location in a ranked set of options. In the paper's final section, I explain why the present view is a kind of teleological non-consequentialism. There is a kind of good that is prior to the right, but as the relevant kind of good does not call for promotion the value theory shows us what is wrong with the consequentialist project. (shrink)

In this paper, I shed light on Kant’s notion of Erkenntnis or cognition by focusing on texts pertaining to Kant’s thoughts on logic. Although a passage from Kant’s Logik is widely referred to for understanding Kant’s conception of Erkenntnis, this work was not penned by Kant himself but rather compiled by Benjamin Jäsche. So, it is imperative to determine its fidelity to Kant’s thought. I compare the passage with other sources, including Reflexionen and students’ lecture notes. I argue that several (...) of the text’s peculiarities stem from Jäsche rather than Kant, but that nevertheless Jäsche largely got Kant's view right, with two major exceptions. First, Jäsche’s text fails to reproduce Kant’s key thesis that kennen and verstehen are jointly sufficient for Erkenntnis. Second, Jäsche’s text gives the false impression that Kant holds that animals have consciousness. (shrink)

A theory of rational belief should get the cases right. It should also reach its verdicts using the right theoretical assumptions. Leading theories seem to predict the wrong things. With only one exception, they don't accommodate principles that we should use to explain these verdicts. We offer a theory of rational belief that combines an attractive picture of epistemic desirability with plausible principles connecting desirability to rationality. On our view, it's rational to believe when it's sufficiently likely that you'd know (...) because believing when it's sufficiently likely that you'd know minimises expected objective epistemic undesirability. (shrink)

On a standard view about reasons, evidence, and justification, there is justification for you to believe all and only what your evidence supports and the reasons that determine whether there is justification to believe are all just pieces of evidence. This view is mistaken about two things. It is mistaken about the rational role of evidence. It is also mistaken about the rational role of reasons. To show this, I present two basis problems for the standard view and argue that (...) it lacks the resources to solve these problems. It is easy to spot these mistakes once we are clear on the ontology of reasons and have a better understanding of the role that belief plays in the theory of possessed evidence. After attacking the standard view, I offer an alternative account of justification. On this view, the justificatory status of a belief is not a function of the reasons/evidence on which it is based (it might not be based on any) but is instead a function of the basis that it can provide. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend externalist accounts of justified belief from Cohen's new evil demon objection. While I think that Cohen might be right that the person is justified in believing what she does, I argue that this is because we can defend the person from criticism and that defending a person is a very different thing from defending a person's attitudes or actions. To defend a person's attitudes or actions, we need to show that they met standards or did (...) not violate norms. Intuitions about whether we can defend a person from criticism are a poor guide when it comes to determining whether norms were violated or standards were met. It turns out that even radical forms of externalism about justification are compatible with the intuitions that Cohen's example elicits. Properly understood, those intuitions show that the believer should be excused from criticism (and excused for failing to believe with adequate justification). (shrink)

In this paper, I shed light on Kant’s notion of Erkenntnis or cognition by focusing on texts pertaining to Kant’s thoughts on logic. Although a passage from Kant’s Logik is widely referred to for understanding Kant’s conception of Erkenntnis, this work was not penned by Kant himself but rather compiled by Benjamin Jäsche. So, it is imperative to determine its fidelity to Kant’s thought. I compare the passage with other sources, including Reflexionen and students’ lecture notes. I argue that several (...) of the text’s peculiarities stem from Jäsche rather than Kant, but that nevertheless Jäsche largely got Kant's view right, with two major exceptions. First, Jäsche’s text fails to reproduce Kant’s key thesis that kennen and verstehen are jointly sufficient for Erkenntnis. Second, Jäsche’s text gives the false impression that Kant holds that animals have consciousness. (shrink)

Must rational thinkers have consistent sets of beliefs? I shall argue that it can be rational for a thinker to believe a set of propositions known to be inconsistent. If this is right, an important test for a theory of rational belief is that it allows for the right kinds of inconsistency. One problem we face in trying to resolve disagreements about putative rational requirements is that parties to the disagreement might be working with different conceptions of the relevant attitudes. (...) My aim is modest. I hope to show that there is at least one important notion of belief such that a thinker might rationally hold a collection of beliefs (so understood) even when the thinker knows their contents entail a contradiction. (shrink)

A discussion of epistemic reasons, theoretical rationality, and the relationship between them. Discusses the ontology of reasons and evidence, the relationship between reasons (motivating, normative, possessed, apparent, genuine, etc.) and rationality, the relationship between epistemic reasons and evidence, the relationship between rationality, justification, and knowledge, and many other related topics.

What relation is there between knowledge and action? According to Hawthorne and Stanley, where your choice is p-dependent, it is appropriate to treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting iff you know that p (RKP). In this paper, I shall argue that it is permissible to treat something as a reason for action even if it isn't known to be true and address Hawthorne and Stanley's arguments for RKP.

The equal weight view says that if you discover that you disagree with a peer, you should decrease your confidence that you are in the right. Since peer disagreement seems to be quite prevalent, the equal weight view seems to tell us that we cannot reasonably believe many of the interesting things we believe because we can always count on a peer to contest the interesting things that we believe. While the equal weight view seems to have skeptical implications, few (...) epistemologists worry about these implications because the equal weight view is quickly falling out of favor. In this paper, I present an analogical argument for the view and defend it from critics who think that we can justifiably retain confidence in the face of peer disagreement. (shrink)

According to the phenomenal conservatives, beliefs are justified by non-doxastic states we might speak of as ‘appearances’ or ‘seemings’. Those who defend the view say that there is something self-defeating about believing that phenomenal conservatism is mistaken. They also claim that the view captures an important internalist insight about justification. I shall argue that phenomenal conservatism is indefensible. The considerations that seem to support the view commit the phenomenal conservatives to condoning morally abhorrent behavior. They can deny that their view (...) forces them to condone morally abhorrent behavior, but then they undercut the defenses of their own view. (shrink)

Mark Schroeder has argued that all reasonable forms of inconsistency of attitude consist of having the same attitude type towards a pair of inconsistent contents (A-type inconsistency). We suggest that he is mistaken in this, offering a number of intuitive examples of pairs of distinct attitudes types with consistent contents which are intuitively inconsistent (B-type inconsistency). We further argue that, despite the virtues of Schroeder's elegant A-type expressivist semantics, B-type inconsistency is in many ways the more natural choice in developing (...) an expressivist account of moral discourse. We close by showing how to adapt ordinary formality-based accounts of logicality to define a B-type account of logical inconsistency and distinguish it from both semantic and pragmatic inconsistency. In sum, we provide a roadmap of how to develop a successful B-type expressivism. (shrink)

Althusser contrasts the Repressive State Apparatus (or RSA) with the Ideological State Apparatus (or ISA). His favored example of the ISA is the school, because it trains citizens in the virtues of work and patriotism as well as inculcating, by precept and discipline, the necessary attitudes and skills for fulfilling the roles assigned to them by their social class in the capitalist..

Most contemporary philosophers of mind assume that consciousness is a natural phenomenon that ought to be subject to scientific explanation. Some think that some further advances in science and/or the philosophy of science will finally reveal to us the nature of consciousness. Others suggest that consciousness may lie beyond the reach of the human intellect, that it will always be a mystery. I argue that the mysteriousness of consciousness results from assuming it to be a natural phenomenon. The feature of (...) consciousness that resists explanation—namely, its subjectivity—is not a natural phenomenon at all, but a social one. Subjectivity exists, and can be explained, only within the perspective of those who play a language-game, share a form of life, belong to a culture. I will try to show just how our social-discursive activity generates the subjective point of view and thus subjective consciousness. (shrink)

We shall evaluate two strategies for motivating the view that knowledge is the norm of belief. The first draws on observations concerning belief's aim and the parallels between belief and assertion. The second appeals to observations concerning Moore's Paradox. Neither of these strategies gives us good reason to accept the knowledge account. The considerations offered in support of this account motivate only the weaker account on which truth is the fundamental norm of belief.

This is part of an authors meets critics session on Daniel Star's wonderful book, Knowing Better. I discuss a potential problem with Kearns and Star's Reasons as Evidence thesis. The issue has to do with the difficulties we face is we treat normative reasons as evidence and impose no possession conditions on evidence. On such a view, it's hard to see how practical reasoning could be a non-monotonic process. One way out of the difficulty would be to allow for (potent) (...) unpossessed reasons but insist that all evidence is possessed evidence. This option, I argue, isn't open to proponents of the Reasons as Evidence thesis. Instead, it seems that they'll have to say that all normative reasons are identified with pieces of possessed evidence. This requires the proponents of the Reasons as Evidence thesis to impose epistemic constraints on norms that some of us find objectionable. (shrink)

In Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, Jessica Brown identifies a number of problems for the so-called knowledge view of justification. According to this view, we cannot justifiably believe what we do not know. Most epistemologists reject this view on the grounds that false beliefs can be justified if, say, supported by the evidence or produced by reliable processes. We think this is a mistake and that many epistemologists are classifying beliefs as justified because they have properties that indicate that something should (...) be excused. Brown thinks that previous attempts to make this case have been unsuccessful. While the difficulties Brown points to are genuine, I think they show that attempts to explain a classificatory judgment haven't been successful. Still, I would argue that the classification is correct. We need a better explanation of this classificatory judgment. I will try to clarify the justification-excuse distinction and explain why it's a mistake to insist that beliefs that violate epistemic norms might be justified. Just as it's possible for a rational agent to act without justification in spite of her best intentions, it's possible that a rational thinker who follows the evidence and meets our expectations might nevertheless believe without sufficient justification. If our justified beliefs are supposed to guide us in deciding what to do, we probably should draw on discussions from morality and the law about the justification/excuse distinction to inform our understanding of the epistemic case. (shrink)

Panentheism is best understood as a philosophical research program. Identifying the core of the research program offers a strong response to the demarcation objection. It also helps focus both objections to and defenses of panentheism — and to show why common objections are not actually criticisms of the position we are defending. The paper also addresses two common criticisms: the alleged inadequacy of panentheism’s double “in” specification of the relationship between God and world, and the “double God” objection. Once the (...) research program framework is in place, topics like these become opportunities for panentheists to engage in the kind of careful constructive work in theology and philosophy — historical, analytic, and systematic — that is required for making long-term, positive contributions to our field. (shrink)